sexta-feira, 9 de janeiro de 2009
Para 'Economist', crise deixa Lula na defensiva em 2009
Revista britânica afirma que presidente usará energias para administrar economia.
BBC Brasil
09/01/2009
A última edição da revista britânica The Economist afirma que o presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva terá de governar na defensiva neste ano, apesar de seus altos índices de popularidade. Um dos principais motivos para isso seria a crise econômica.
No artigo, intitulado "Lula's last lap" ("A última volta de Lula"), a publicação afirma que os altos índices de popularidade do presidente - classificados como "espantosos" para um segundo mandato - podem dar uma aparência de "onipotência" a Lula, mas que ela é apenas "ilusória".
"Até as eleições (presidenciais, do ano que vem), a maior parte das energias de Lula deve ser gasta no gerenciamento da crise", diz a revista. O texto afirma que muitos brasileiros que esperam que 2009 seja melhor que 2008 devem se "decepcionar", já que a economia apenas começou a sentir os "solavancos" da crise.
Para a Economist, a tarefa de gerenciamento da turbulência econômica deve ser complicada, já que o espaço para lançar estímulos fiscais no Brasil é "limitado".
A revista compara a situação do país com a do Chile, que anunciou nesta semana um plano de estímulo de US$ 4 bilhões e que pode facilmente administrar o déficit fiscal resultante, por ter acumulado reservas quando o preço do cobre - seu maior produto de exportação - estava alto.
"Mas o governo brasileiro, que tem uma dívida pública muito maior, precisa preservar o seu superávit fiscal para reter a confiança dos proprietários de títulos." A revista ainda afirma que a arrecadação de impostos deve diminuir com a retração da economia.
Para a publicação, se a inflação continuar preocupante, o que fará com que o Banco Central evite cortes na taxa de juros, o governo vai começar a ser pressionado - "especialmente pelo PT" - para encontrar outras maneiras de estimular o crescimento econômico, o que pode incluir mais crédito para a agricultura e empreiteiras.
"Nos últimos anos, todas as vezes em que a economia apresentava problemas, os políticos brasileiros acalmaram os mercados demonstrando seu compromisso com a ortodoxia econômica. Alguns analistas se preocupam que este compromisso pode ser débil. Mas, neste ano, com governos ao redor do mundo intervindo nos mercados, os investidores devem ficar seguros se o Brasil fizer o mesmo - até certo ponto", diz a revista.
Lula foi complacente com a crise global, diz 'FT'
Jornal afirma que a crise tornou-se um problema do presidente brasileiro.
BBC
09/01/2009
O presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva foi complacente ao lidar com os primeiros estágios da crise econômica global, que chegou à América Latina - e ao Brasil -, diz reportagem desta sexta-feira do jornal britânico Financial Times.
Segundo o diário britânico, a crise está frustrando o otimismo que existia no continente até poucos meses atrás de que conseguiria escapar do pior.
Em artigo intitulado "Going South" ("Piorando", em tradução livre), o jornal, especializado em finanças, lembra que o presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva disse em setembro que a crise era do presidente americano George W. Bush.
"(Mas) agora ela é de Lula da Silva", afirma. E o FT diz que "a produção industrial do país caiu 6,2% no ano até novembro, segundo números anunciados nesta semana - a queda mais acentuada da produção desde dezembro de 2001".
"O líder brasileiro não estava sozinho em sua complacência", ao acreditar que a turbulência não atingiria o seu paísl, disse o jornal. "Por todo o continente a crise provocou uma destruição de riqueza em grande escala."
Comércio online cresce 30% em 2008, diz estudo
Agência Estado / Ana Luísa Westphalen
09/01/2009
O faturamento nominal do setor de comércio online atingiu R$ 8,2 bilhões em 2008, o que representa um avanço de 30% em relação ao ano anterior. O número faz parte de balanço preliminar divulgado hoje pela E-bit, empresa especializada no segmento. Segundo o levantamento, o tíquete médio foi de R$ 328 e o período mais lucrativo foi o Natal, responsável por vendas que totalizaram R$ 1,25 bilhão. Os números finais serão apresentados na primeira quinzena de fevereiro.
Na avaliação do diretor-geral da empresa, Pedro Guasti, o crescimento anual do segmento está ligado à profissionalização das lojas e à crescente confiança do consumidor nas transações online. Ele também destaca a entrada de grandes redes varejistas, que segundo o diretor trouxeram novos públicos para o comércio eletrônico. "As lojas estão agindo de forma mais profissional e planejada, tanto no quesito de estoques de produtos e prazos de entregas de mercadorias quanto na governança de maneira geral", observou.
Em 2009, a expectativa do executivo para o faturamento do comércio pela internet é otimista. Ele acredita que o setor deve crescer nominalmente entre 20% e 25% em relação a 2008, alcançando R$ 10 bilhões.
Caixa confirma empréstimo de R$ 3 bi a construtoras
Rodrigo Postigo
09/01/2009
O Diário Oficial da União publicou nesta quinta-feira circular na qual confirma que a Caixa Econômica Federal concederá até R$ 3 bilhões em empréstimos às construtoras com recursos do Fundo de Garantia por Tempo de Serviço (FGTS).
A operação, que já havia sido aprovada pelo conselho curador do FGTS em dezembro de 2008, prevê que os recursos devem ser aplicados pelas empresas na construção de residências que estejam de acordo com o Sistema Financeiro de Habitação (SFH).
A taxa mínima de juros para esses empréstimos será de 7%. No caso de empreendimentos não classificados como habitações populares, o valor mínimo é de 9%.
Brasil deve ser 5º maior mercado do mundo, avalia Anfavea
Agência Estado / Beth Moreira
09/01/2009
O presidente da Associação Nacional dos Fabricantes de Veículos Automotores (Anfavea), Jackson Schneider, ressaltou hoje que, apesar da queda das vendas em outubro e novembro, o setor encerrou o ano com volume recorde, o que deve colocar o País na posição de quinto maior mercado do mundo. "Só precisamos esperar os dados fechados de outros países para confirmar essa informação", disse.
A estimativa do executivo é que os Estados Unidos continuem na liderança do ranking em 2008, seguidos pela China, Japão e Alemanha. Se confirmado o Brasil na quinta posição, o País ficará à frente do Reino Unido e da França, que no ano anterior estavam à frente no ranking.
O presidente da Anfavea ressaltou ainda que o volume de produção, que alcançou 3,21 milhões em 2008, também foi recorde. Com esse número o Brasil se consagra como o sexto maior produtor de automóveis do mundo.
Lula's last lap
From The Economist
Jan 8th 2009 RIO DE JANEIRO
A freakishly popular president has only a year left before electioneering curtails his mandate. He will spend it reacting rather than reforming are often disappointing. It is rare indeed to find a president in his second term with an approval rating of 80%, as Brazil’s Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva now enjoys. No American president since the second world war has managed it. In Latin America, only Colombia’s Álvaro Uribe at the height of his success last year against the FARC guerrillas has touched a similar level of adoration. So Lula, a pragmatic former trade-union leader, is entering his penultimate year in office in a position in which he ought to be able to do almost anything.
Yet this apparent omnipotence is illusory, not least because it will be brief: by early 2010 the president will start to be overshadowed by the campaign to elect his successor. He is also constrained by his own left-wing Workers’ Party (PT); by his political allies; by the economic troubles that only recently reached Brazil’s shores and have yet to be felt to their full extent; and by his temperamental compulsion to preserve his popularity. “I would not like to be called a populist,” he sometimes says, “but I do like to be popular.”
Lula still talks about reforming Brazil’s labyrinthine tax system and improving the way its political parties and elections work. These were supposed to have been the priorities of his second term. Both are properly matters for Congress, though if he wished the president could use his vast political capital to try to force them through.
Yet they are forever being postponed, sometimes on flimsy excuses. Tax reform was put off at the end of last year because of the gloomy economic outlook. In fact, that makes simplifying the tax code (which according to the World Bank takes a typical Brazilian company 2,600 hours a year to comply with) more important than ever. It will not be considered again until the end of February. As for political reform, this is more likely to be decided in the courts: Brazil’s elected officials are still waiting to see how much bite there is in a ruling by the Supreme Court that prohibits the common practice of switching parties straight after an election.
“People have been talking about these reforms since 1988 [when Brazil’s constitution was approved],” says João Augusto de Castro Neves, a political consultant in Brasília. “It is like a badge of political seriousness to do so.” Instead of pursuing them, he reckons, Lula will be fully occupied just keeping his coalition government together. The Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement, a ramshackle concoction of regional political barons that is the coalition’s biggest force, is trying to secure the presidencies of both houses of Congress, which are being contested at the moment. If it succeeds the party will apply its customary leg-irons to any attempts at reform. If not, its leaders will need placating, which will amount to the same thing.
Unlike Mr Uribe in Colombia (see article), Lula has made it clear that he will not seek to cling to office by changing the constitution to allow him to run for a third consecutive term. The idea was floated by leaders of the Workers’ Party, which worries about its fortunes once its talisman has gone. Commendably, Lula scotched it, leaving the PT searching for a viable successor. He has pushed the candidacy of Dilma Rousseff, his chief of staff. She is a competent political insider, but lacks mass appeal. But even if the centre-right opposition wins power, Lula knows that his social policies, centred on Bolsa Família, a cash-transfer scheme benefiting 11m poor families, are unlikely to be overturned.
Until the election most of Lula’s energies are likely to be taken up with crisis-management. According to IBOPE, a pollster, 74% of Brazilians expect this year to be better than last. They are likely to be disappointed: the economic data will get worse as the year progresses because the economy has only recently started to splutter after growing rapidly for the first nine months of 2008.
“Any preconceived political plans will have to be torn up to deal with this crisis,” says Raul Velloso, a consultant in Brasília who follows public finances. Mr Velloso is worried about possible further weakness in the exchange rate (the real depreciated by 17% against the dollar in the last three months of 2008), and also by the ability of Brazilian companies to roll over their debt.
Brazil’s scope for fiscal stimulus is limited. Chile’s government this week announced a $4 billion bundle of measures aimed at creating 100,000 jobs and helping poorer families. It can easily finance the resulting fiscal deficit forecast at 3% of GDP this year because it built up a war chest of public savings when prices for copper, its main export, were high.
But Brazil’s government, with a much bigger public debt, needs to preserve its primary fiscal surplus (ie, before interest payments) to retain the confidence of bondholders. Tax revenues will slow along with the economy. The government’s priority is to implement its expansionary “growth acceleration” programme of public investment (better known as PAC from its initials in Portuguese) rather than adopt new measures, says Nelson Barbosa, a deputy minister of finance. Everything the government does this year will be presented as part of the PAC, says a civil servant in Lula’s office.
If inflation remains stubborn, preventing the Central Bank from cutting interest rates, the government will come under pressure, especially from the PT, to find other ways to boost growth. These could include guaranteeing credit to farmers and construction firms. In recent years, whenever the economy has started to wobble Brazil’s politicians have calmed markets by demonstrating their commitment to economic orthodoxy. Some commentators worry that this commitment may be flagging. But this year, with governments around the world intervening in markets, investors may even be reassured if Brazil does the same—up to a point.
Going south
Financial Times
By Stephen Fidler
Published: January 9 2009 02:00 Last updated: January 9 2009 02:00
Until a few months ago, as financial and economic turmoil gripped the industrialised world, Latin America was suffused with optimism that it would escape the worst. "People ask me about the crisis and I answer, 'go ask Bush'," Brazil's President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva said of his US counterpart in early September. "It is his crisis, not mine."
It is Mr Lula da Silva's now. Brazil's industrial production sank 6.2 per cent in the year to November, according to figures announced this week - the sharpest decline in output since December 2001.
Across the continent, the crisis has brought about a large-scale destruction of wealth. Claudio Loser, a former western hemisphere chief at the International Monetary Fund, calculates that 40 per cent of Latin America's financial wealth was wiped out in the first 11 months of 2008 through falls in stock and other asset markets and currency depreciation. That $2,200bn (£1,440bn, €1,610bn) loss alone could cut domestic spending by 5 per cent next year, he estimates.
On top of that, flows of credit from abroad have contracted sharply and the region, much of which depends on exporting raw materials, has been pummelled by a collapse in commodities prices. The deterioration in Latin America's terms of trade - the price of exports divided by the price of imports - could hit even harder than the credit crisis, says Mr Loser, now with the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington think-tank. "The fact that the terms of trade have gone so far against the Latin American economies in terms of agriculture, minerals and petroleum is really going to hit the region very hard," he says.
Forecasts for growth are being slashed. Economists generally expect gross domestic product across the region to rise by only 1.4 per cent this year, with Mexico thought likely to slip marginally into negative territory. The balance of risks is heavily on the downside. At best, the economic progress of 570m people will all but stall, with the poor among them hit hardest, according to the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, a United Nations offshoot.
But the Brazilian leader was hardly alone in his complacency. Hard lessons from past financial crises had encouraged caution among Latin American policymakers. Many governments had curbed foreign borrowing by both public and private sectors. They kept debt ratios low, floated their currencies to avoid devaluation crises and built foreign exchange reserves. They watched their banks like hawks, which helped to ensure these were mostly free of US toxic debt.
As a result, many economists and government officials saw the region as better positioned than at any time in five decades to withstand a severe blow. But the worst global shock for three-quarters of a century has exposed weaknesses masked by the aggregate numbers.
One such weakness in Brazil and Mexico was a series of flawed derivatives contracts that companies had entered into with a group of investment banks. This left them scrambling to secure dollars, pitching the Brazilian real and Mexican peso into a tailspin during October. "The irony is that this happened from the corporate side; we were watching the banks very closely," says Guillermo Ortiz, Mexico's central bank governor.
Countries so far unaffected by the credit crisis are those that for the most part were already frozen out of international financial markets. But this group, which includes Ecuador, Venezuela and Argentina, will not escape the downturn.
These governments spent freely during the commodities boom. Venezuela's leftist President Hugo Chávez and Ecuador's Rafael Correa enjoyed record oil prices and Argentina, which taxes agricultural exports, basked in the surge in farm prices. But now these economies are in a bind. Unlike Chile and one or two others, their governments set little aside for a rainy day.
With no possibility of raising money by issuing debt, they will be forced to rein in spending, accentuating the downturn: a classic pro-cyclical fiscal policy. Ecuador is further constrained by its dollarised economy, which means it is unable to run an independent monetary policy.
Ecuador and Argentina have both taken action recently to loosen the straitjacket. Ecuador announced last month that it would default on foreign debt for the second time in a decade. Argentina's government has nationalised private pension funds, through which it can get its hands on more resources to pay its debts.
But it is not clear whether any extra leeway this gives the governments will be outweighed by damaged confidence. Argentina's nationalisation announcement, for example, was followed by a mini-flight of capital to neighbouring Uruguay on fears that the government, in emulation of predecessors, would nationalise bank deposits. A history of financial crises and debt defaults limits the options for Argentina. A popular dread of governments debasing the currency means one tool, devaluation, is regarded as useless because any benefits would be swallowed by inflation.
Not only in Argentina does history constrain the policy options. Everywhere there are questions about whether Latin American governments have the credibility to counter recession by relaxing fiscal or monetary policy. Indeed, some economists argue that improvements in economic management do not go very deep.
Even in boom times, Latin American growth has not matched the levels of Asia's best performers. This, they say, is because of structural impediments - such as monopolies, bureaucracy and inflexible labour markets - that governments have been unable or unwilling to remove. Even normally exemplary Chile retains a system of indexation that passes price rises straight into wages. This fed inflation last year. As for Brazil, the region's largest economy, Sebastian Ed-wards of the University of California Los Angeles says Mr Lula da Silva is lavished with praise simply for "not being Chávez".
If any country has built credibility, it is Chile. Santiago has run fiscal surpluses equivalent to 6-7 per cent of GDP over the last three years and now has room for public spending to increase. Chile is "in a much better position than other nations, and than Chile itself in previous episodes, to face this period of turbulence", says Andrés Velasco, finance minister.
Chile and Brazil both have tools not available to some industrial countries. They have been able to direct credit to the private sector through state-owned banks. Brazil's central bank was also able to liberate billions of reals in compulsory reserves to ease liquidity problems of small and medium-sized banks.
Yet if the crisis persists, such marginal extra room for manoeuvre will count for little. Even Brazil, with headline foreign exchange reserves of more than $200bn, could be troubled if the halt to credit continues long into the year.
A proportion of those reserves are already spoken for, tied up in forward currency and swaps deals, economists say - and more than one-quarter of Brazil's $600bn-plus public debt falls due in less than a year. Even though most of it is denominated in domestic rather than foreign currency, the prospect of foreign debt holders continuing to run for the exit is daunting.
Part of the problem, says Ricardo Hausmann of Harvard University, derives from US efforts to shake off the crisis. Washington is expected to issue trillions of dollars of debt to bail out its financial system, save its car industry and reflate its economy. But this means "people are unwilling to lend to almost anybody except for the US Treasury", causing "fairly well be-haved countries" such as Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Peru to lose most of their access to external finance.
Guillermo Calvo of Columbia University says this shows the US "crowding out Latin America and other emerging markets". He and Mr Hausmann are among economists who estimate that $250bn is needed by the region's public sector this year just to pay off maturing debt and provide budget support.
Brazil, Colombia and Mexico have in recent weeks launched bond issues, suggesting that international markets are not completely closed to them. But it is not yet clear how significant that is If countries cannot raise the sums they need, governments could feel forced to adopt import restrictions, capital controls and, worse, beggar-thy-neighbour policies such as tariff increases and competitive devaluations that intensified the 1930s Depression.
To avoid this, the economists say, the IMF and the other public international financial institutions - now lending well below $100bn a year to all their government clients worldwide - should mobilise unprecedented resources. They urge the creation of a special fund that can purchase private and public securities in emerging economies without stigmatising borrowers in the way that traditional IMF programmes have in the past.
Latin American nations have often turned, unwillingly, to the IMF and its sister organisations to help resolve financial crises mostly of their own making. Yet though the region is likely to need the institutions again, this time to surmount a deep crisis whose origins lie far away, it is doubtful that the mechanisms or the resources are in place to do the job.
